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Abstract—Many wireless communications systems found in
aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them funda-
mentally vulnerable to attack. With affordable software-defined
radios available, a novel threat has emerged, allowing a wide
range of attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic
systems. Whilst these vulnerabilities are known, concrete attacks
that exploit them are still novel and not yet well understood. This
is true in particular with regards to their kinetic impact on the
handling of the attacked aircraft and consequently its safety.
To investigate this, we invited 30 Airbus A320 type-rated
pilots to fly simulator scenarios in which they were subjected
to attacks on their avionics. We implement and analyse novel
wireless attacks on three safety-related systems: Traffic Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground Proximity Warning System
(GPWS) and the Instrument Landing System (ILS).
We found that all three analysed attack scenarios cre-
ated significant control impact and cost of disruption through
turnarounds, avoidance manoeuvres, and diversions. They fur-
ther increased workload, distrust in the affected system, and in
38% of cases caused the attacked safety system to be switched
off entirely. All pilots felt the scenarios were useful, with 93.3%
feeling that simulator training for wireless attacks could be
valuable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, flying has become ever safer,
culminating in the year 2017, where not a single death was
recorded for commercial passenger air travel [4]. As a whole,
the aviation industry and regulators have achieved this with a
meticulous focus on safety, for example regarding the testing,
maintenance and certification requirements of an aircraft.
Two important aspects of this all-permeating safety mindset
can be seen both in the continuous training of pilots in
flight simulator scenarios, preparing them for safety-critical
situations, and also in the numerous wireless technologies
on board an aircraft, which are meant to increase situational
awareness for pilots and air traffic control (ATC).
If these avionic systems malfunction or are not used as
intended, consequences can be serious. Examples include an
inoperative transponder on board a Delta Airlines aircraft in
March 2011, which remained undetected for ten minutes [13].
During this time it flew in close proximity to three aircraft—a
working transponder would have helped avoid this situation. In
extreme cases, equipment malfunction can cause loss of life.
In 2006, two aircraft collided in Brazil partly due to a failing
transponder not providing collision avoidance messages [1].
Similar to many industries with safety-critical components,
aviation is currently working on securing their infrastructure
against the new threat of cyber attacks. In this process, all
wireless technologies have come under scrutiny, as they almost
in their entirety lack fundamental security mechanisms [57].
A subset has been shown to be exploitable under laboratory
conditions using widely accessible software-defined radios
(SDRs) and software tools (e.g., [9], [50], [54]).
Since publication of these proof-of-concept demonstrations,
discussion has been ongoing within the aviation sector about
the severity and reality of the threat of wireless attacks on
safety systems under actual flight conditions. Recent research
from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security indicating
remote compromise of a Boeing 757 aircraft was dismissed
by the manufacturer, who claimed confidence in the security
of its aircraft [10]. Several surveys on the perspectives of
pilots and other aviation professionals highlight that opinion
is split. Some believe attackers could succeed in creating
‘unsafe flight conditions’—the prominent view, however, is
that such attacks are mitigated already through aviation’s
extensive safety systems and culture [2], [56].
Unfortunately, security research into avionics [9], [50], [54],
[55] has already shown that the threat is not fundamentally
addressed by safety-oriented design, which deals with random
mechanical, electronic, or human failure, rather than deliberate
and targeted attempts to subvert the system. Similar to con-
ventional security threats by passengers or pilots, attackers can
negatively influence the safety of an aircraft, if they are able
to replicate failures of the wireless avionics systems.
However, taking a standard security assessment approach
to this faces a number of challenges. First, flight hardware
is extremely expensive and difficult to use in isolation, mak-
ing the construction of a real-world test bed prohibitive for
independent research. Even more importantly, however, the
flight crew have the ultimate authority over how an aircraft is
flown, so their response to attacks can create a broad range
of impacts from amplifying the effects to mitigating them
entirely. Hence, examining wireless attacks with the pilots in
the loop is a necessary requirement to gauge their true impact,
i.e., the effect on handling and safety of the aircraft.
To quantify this impact, we implement three novel wireless
interference attacks in a human in the loop environment. Our
work recruits 30 professional airline pilots to fly scenarios in a
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2flight simulator during which they are subject to realistic cyber
attacks. The attacks are based on an analysis of theoretical
vulnerabilities and real-world interference incidents in three
heavily used safety-related systems: the Instrument Landing
System (ILS), Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and
the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS).
Contributions: This paper identifies which systems
should be the focus of the security effort as it is the first
study to analyse the impact of novel remote wireless attacks
with pilots in the loop. Our contributions are as follows:
• We describe concrete wireless attacks on avionics, ad-
vancing the state of the art for three systems: collision
avoidance, instrument landing and ground proximity.
• We implement these attacks in a flight simulator and run
experiments with 30 Airbus A320 pilots in the loop to
test their true effect within aviation’s safety culture.
• We analyse in-simulator and interview debrief results
from the experiments, quantifying the attacks’ kinetic
impact on handling and safety of the aircraft as well as
potential mitigations and countermeasures.
We begin with background in Sec. II, before outlining our
threat model in Sec. III. We discuss systems and attacks in
Sec. IV, then cover our experimental method in Sec. V. Our
results are presented in Sec. VI, followed by discussion in
Sec. VII. We provide mitigations and recommendations in
Sec. VIII and conclude in Sec. IX.
II. BACKGROUND
Whilst cyber security in aviation is a more recent concern,
investigation in to the effectiveness of flight simulators for
training is more developed. In this section we consider the
background for both of these areas.
A. Cyber Security in Aviation
Increasing awareness of cyber threats in aviation has spurred
early-stage research into attacks and countermeasures. An
early analysis of surveillance system vulnerability generated
more widespread attention [9]. At the threat modelling level,
several works assess feasible types of attack. In [34], the
highlighted threats are spoofing, exploiting, denial of service
and counterfeiting. Our study focusses on the spoofing and
denial of service attacks. In [43], specific threats are enumer-
ated, including possible consequences of attacks on collision
avoidance systems. We directly assess some of these effects.
Furthermore, technical research into the security of sec-
ondary surveillance radar (SSR) systems has assessed the
constraints on an attacker aiming to inject, modify or delete
SSR messages [50], and provided a thorough assessment of
the potential security solutions available [55].
Awareness about cyber attacks varies, as demonstrated
in [57]. The authors survey aviation professionals on their
perceptions on the security of a range of different avionic
systems. Whilst there is awareness that the systems are not
inherently secure, there does not appear to be significant
concern that attacks could affect operational capability.
B. Simulator Training
Time spent in the simulator is a vital part of professional
pilot training. A body of research analyzes the configuration
of simulator scenarios such that they transfer most easily to
flying the real aircraft. Early research indicated that it provides
notable benefit over aircraft-only training [26]. However, it is
not a given that high-fidelity simulation transfer skills well,
and the literature suggests that well-designed scenarios are
vital in equipping pilots effectively [45], [11].
One of the key factors in cyber attacks is that there may
be no forewarning, leading to surprise and loss of capacity.
In [35], a survey of aviation incident reports highlights that
‘normal’ events can be surprising to pilots when they occur
out of context, i.e. alerts when the conditions do not warrant
it. The authors in [38], [7] consider this with respect to stall
recovery manoeuvres, a regularly tested skill for pilots. Both
papers find that pilots struggled to follow even well-known
procedures when the stall occurred in unexpected conditions.
Addressing this, the authors of [39] argue that unpredictabil-
ity and variability in simulator training improves performance
when encountering surprise scenarios. While their work uses
failure scenarios instead of malicious interference, the argu-
ments remain valid.
C. Simulating Cyber Attacks
Some work addressing simulation for cyber security has
begun to emerge. In [25] the authors conduct a human factors
focussed study to assess how pilots respond to an attack on
ground-based navigation systems. They find that pilots under
attack lose some monitoring capacity, and that warnings can
help mitigate this. The authors of [6] (and the extended [15])
conduct a more avionics-focussed set of attacks, looking at six
variants of navigation and flight management system threats.
Multiple attacks inserted over the course of one flight with
the intention being to assess if pilots notice the attacks. They
found that most attacks were identified during flight, however
some happened without detection.
Our work differs in that we focus specifically on systems
that are either entirely or partly safety-critical in their usage,
with the attacker instead aiming to disrupt. We also choose to
explore a different set of systems and cover the principles of
these attacks in technical detail.
III. THREAT MODEL
We presume a moderately resourced attacker, with a budget
in the region of $10-15,000 to buy commercially off-the-
shelf antennae, amplifiers, and SDRs. This would enable
them to transmit at sufficient power to communicate with
airborne aircraft. We also presume they have the capability
to develop software, or use existing open-source tools, to
interfere with aircraft systems. Our attacker can deploy their
systems remotely or create a mobile platform from which to
do this.
a) Threat Actors.: We consider three threat actors: ac-
tivists, terrorists and nation states. Activists intend to cause
disruption to raise the profile of their cause, usually with
low resource but high levels of personnel. On the other hand,
3Fig. 1: Normal system operation with radio altimeter deter-
mining height above ground.
terrorists aim to disrupt or destroy with the intent of creating a
chilling effect or fear. They can be moderately resourced and
are unlikely to care about collateral damage. Most extreme is
the nation state who primarily intend to disrupt in order to
paralyse infrastructure. They are well resourced and are likely
to be concerned about attribution and collateral.
b) Attack Aims.: We focus on attempts to cause disrup-
tion, rather than destructive impact. This is due to our work
looking to the fundamentals of the attacks, in which disruption
is likely to be the first effect, though these likely have
destructive variants. This can include diversions to alternative
airports, excessive movement away from planned routes or
go-arounds, i.e. a missed approach to land followed by a
second attempt. This work performs a feasibility analysis on
the effects of these attacks, which is indicative of the impact
they would have under a stronger threat model. As such, we
believe that based on our results, future work could focus on
this aspect. We discuss this further in Sec. VII.
Furthermore, we are careful to ensure the experiment is fair.
In scenarios where the aircraft is put at risk of crashing it
would be unrealistic to assess pilot response outside of their
normal environment. For example, we could not accurately
assess response times if controls are slightly different to a full
simulator or real aircraft. We cover our experimental setup and
its limitations in Sec. V.
IV. SYSTEMS AND ATTACKS
We now describe the systems and theory of attacks used in
the experiment, including attacker capabilities and expected
crew responses.
A. Ground Proximity Warning System
A fundamental part of an aircraft’s ‘safety net’, the Ground
Proximity Warning System (GPWS) provides early warning
of the aircraft becoming too close to terrain [5].
1) System Description: Two versions of this system exist—
the original GPWS, and the newer Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS)
which incorporates GPS and a terrain database. The subsystem
used in this study is the same in both. Taking a range of
sensor inputs, GPWS provides alarms of situations leading to
collision with terrain [60]. It has a range of alert modes; we
focus on excessive closure on terrain, or Mode 2 [5].
Mode 2 GPWS uses a radio altimeter to determine the rate
of closure on nearby terrain; we provide a representation of
this on approach in Fig. 1. A radio altimeter is a Frequency-
Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar, transmitting
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Fig. 2: Frequency-modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar
operation at a static height, for both the transmitted signal and
received, reflected signal.
pulses on frequency sweeps between 4200 and 4400 MHz.
It uses the frequency shift and round trip time for the received
signal to calculate the height above terrain, also referred to as
above ground level (AGL). Its operation is illustrated in Fig. 2,
where ∆t is the round trip time, and ∆f is the frequency shift.
Mode 2 has two sub-modes, A and B: A is primarily active
during climb and cruise whilst B is used during approach and
landing. Excessive terrain closure will be met with audio alerts,
the most serious of which is ‘Terrain Terrain, Pull Up.’ GPWS
is considered a high priority alert for crew [53].
2) Attack Description: Our attacker aims to create a spu-
rious alert to negatively impact situational awareness and
cause an unwarranted go-around. As a result, aircraft will
then have perform a second approach or divert to a different
airport. During this time, the aircraft will be using extra fuel,
incurring delay, as well as adding workload for the pilots. By
transmitting false radar pulses on final approach, the attacker
causes the GPWS to believe that the terrain closure rate is
significantly higher than reality. This will trigger a ‘Terrain
Terrain, Pull Up’ whilst the aircraft is close to the ground yet
within a ‘safe’ range.
Two methods could enable this attack. A targeted attack
aims to replicate the rapid closing of ground by transmitting a
ramp of frequencies between 4200 MHz and 4400 MHz. The
gradient of this ramp is crafted to incrementally reduce the
round trip time per frequency shift for the signal, creating the
illusion of the ground approaching rapidly.
This requires some prediction of the signal phase from the
radio altimeter, as well as knowledge of the sweep frequency—
however this is standardized. Since Mode 2 alerts are based
on the rate of descent, the attacker can at least calculate the
target change in round trip time (RTT) to trigger an alarm. For
example, descending at 3000 ft/min (˜15.4 m/s) at 500 ft AGL
(˜152.4 m) will trigger an alarm according to standard (Fig.
A2b in [60]). Using a simple model of the aircraft moving
a negligible amount during a pulse, we use the difference in
RTT over the course of one second (i.e. the aircraft at 152.4 m
AGL, then one second later having descended 15.4 m). Eq. 1
then gives us the required change in is RTT, in which trtt is
RTT, h is height above ground and c is the speed of light. This
indicates a small jump in frequency per round trip is needed.
∆trtt =
2(h1 − h2)
c
=
2(152.4− 137.0)
c
≈ 1.03−7s/m (1)
4Another approach is to flood the aircraft with many signals
within the radar frequency range, either at a specific frequency
or randomly. The behaviour of the radio altimeter in this
scenario is unknown as it would be receiving effectively
unpredictable pulses, so we do not consider it further.
Expected Response: Whilst the response will depend on
the aircraft and airline, there are common principles [53]. In
most conditions we expect a terrain avoidance manoeuvre, i.e.
a steep climb to a safe altitude. In our scenario, this will
lead to a missed approach. However, below 1000 ft above
aerodrome level (AAL), with full certainty of position, crew
can choose to not follow this. Due to the surprise element,
we expect the typical response to be a missed approach. On
following approaches we expect participants to have identified
unexpected behaviour and disregard the warnings.
3) Requirements & Feasibility: For this, an attacker will
need a number of directional antenna underneath the approach
path to transmit to the radio altimeter. These will be fed by
SDRs and software capable of transmitting correctly modu-
lated pulses; such equipment would be in the low $1000s.
Although an attacker could operate such a system remotely,
the hardware would need to be located near to the runway.
The ability to deploy depends on the airfield security and
perimeter size. Whilst an attacker could cause maximum con-
fusion with a late alarm, this attack can take place from afar.
Using a representative 130 knots landing speed descending at
a standard 700 ft/min, an attack at 500 ft AGL would occur
around 1.7 miles from the start of the runway.1
With regards to system resilience, GPWS radio altimeter
is known to suffer interference from outside sources. In [28],
instances of unexplained GPWS alarms on approach to an
airport were explained by emissions from a nearby military
radar. Outside interference on radio altimeter frequencies has
been occuring for some time, with discussions ongoing due
to the importance of the instrument [33]. As such, a targeted
attacker could have a greater effect.
4) Simulator Implementation: We simulate the attack by
triggering the GPWS ‘Terrain, Terrain, Pull Up’ alarm starting
500 ft AGL on approach to Runway 33 at Birmingham,
increasing by 250 ft for each subsequent attack. With this we
are emulating the ability of an attacker to add some unpre-
dictability to the attack. One of the limitations of this approach
is that the point at which the attack actually triggers can vary
between 450 ft and 500 ft AGL, and the radio altimeter visual
does not show an ‘under attack’ change for the time under
attack.
B. Traffic Collision Avoidance System
Although ATC manage airspace with high precision, aircraft
can still end up closer than is safe. This is called a loss of
separation, and in the worst case, can result in a mid-air
collision. One such example occured in March 2011, where a
Delta aircraft took off with an inactive transponder, becoming
too close to three other aircraft before resolving the issue [13].
1This is calculated based on the aircraft taking ∼42 s to reach the touchdown
zone.
Resolution Advisory (RA) Region
Traffic Advisory (RA) Region
Nearby Aircraft
Fig. 3: Representation of TCAS Traffic (TA) and Resolution
Advisory (RA) zones.
Object aircraft Nearby aircraft
Mode S broadcast (including ICAO identifier)
Repeat until out of range
Mode S interrogation using ICAO identifier
Response (inc. altitude, bearing)
(a) Protocol diagram for TCAS interrogation using the Mode S data link, where
nearby aircraft respond with information on their position.
Object aircraft Nearby aircraft
Mode C-only all-call
Mode C response (inc. altitude if available)
Interrogation 
Repeat until out of range
(b) Protocol diagram of TCAS all-call interrogation using Mode C, and response
from nearby aircraft with altitude if available. Range and bearing are calculated
from response.
Fig. 4: Representation of TCAS interrogation protocols of
nearby aircraft using Mode C and S transponders.
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) provides a tech-
nical means to avoid this, and has been mandated on aircraft
with more than 30 seats since 1993 [17], [27].
1) System Description: TCAS makes use of the Mode C or
Mode S transponders fitted to an object aircraft to interrogate
nearby aircraft [17]. Establishing nearby aircraft with Mode
S requires the object aircraft to listen for IDs in Mode S
‘squitters’, which are messages in response to ground-based
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) interrogations. The ob-
ject aircraft can then interrogate these IDs to calculate whether
nearby aircraft will become too close [18]. An abstracted
protocol diagram for Mode S can be seen in Fig. 4a.
Mode C operates differently, shown in Fig. 4b. The object
aircraft issues Mode C-only interrogations called all-calls,
causing all nearby aircraft with Mode C transponders to
respond once per second with their altitude. Since Mode C
does not carry the same data fields as Mode S, the object
aircraft estimates range and bearing [19]. To limit interference
it uses a whisper-shout transmission mechanism, gradually
increasing power and suppressing aircraft who have already
responded.
Based on lateral and vertical proximity to nearby aircraft,
5visual representation and alerts are given to crew. These come
in two steps as represented in Fig. 3. First is a traffic advisory
(TA), in which the traffic is typically displayed to the pilot
as amber and an aural alert of ‘traffic’ is given. If the nearby
aircraft becomes closer to the aircraft, a resolution advisory
(RA) is given. An RA will contain specific instructions for
the flight crew, i.e., to climb or descend at a given rate, or
hold vertical speed. These instructions are decided between
the two aircraft automatically to deconflict the situation. RA
instructions must be followed within seconds.
In the cockpit, crew have control over the alerting level; they
can select Standby, TA-ONLY, or TA/RA. For most of a flight,
TCAS will be set to TA/RA in which full alerting is provided.
TA-ONLY does not issue RAs, whereas Standby performs no
TCAS interrogations or conflict resolution [20].
2) Attack Description: In this scenario our attacker aims to
cause crew responses to TCAS by triggering TAs and RAs
despite no aircraft being nearby. This is intended to burn
unnecessary fuel, break from air traffic control clearances and
cause knock-on alerts for other aircraft, possibly resulting in
diversions or switching TCAS off. This is due to Mode C and
S transmissions being sent in the clear with no authentication.
Scha¨fer et. al. use a similar concept on a system which uses
Mode S, the concepts of which we translate to TCAS [50].
An attacker generates Mode C/S TCAS responses for a false
intruder aircraft gradually approach the object aircraft from a
distance, with the closest point of approach being sufficient
for alarm. We will refer to the aircraft under attack as target
and the injected aircraft as false.
We firstly presume that we can establish the altitude, head-
ing and speed of the target aircraft from broadcast surveillance
messages [55]. Injection then depends on whether they use
Mode S or Mode C:
• Mode S: the attacker transmits a false aircraft squitter
message. When the target aircraft then interrogates, the
attacker transmits Mode S responses as if the false aircraft
were travelling on a collision course with the target.
• Mode C: the attacker responds to an all-call and fol-
lowing interrogations for the false aircraft. Whisper-
shout may cause interrogations to be too low power to
be received by the attacker, in which case they would
need to approximate a response. However, this would be
stochastic as interrogation rates are standardized.
The attacker can choose whether to cause the target to climb
or descend by injecting an aircraft below or above the object
aircraft respectively.
A different approach would be to flood the frequencies
with Mode C/S responses from a false aircraft. However, the
1090 MHz link is liable to overcrowding and message loss,
meaning that flooding could simply jam the frequency [51].
Expected Response: Since following an RA is compul-
sory, we expect that most pilots will comply with at least
the first instance thus following the instructed manouvre [52].
From there we expect some participants to doubt RAs and
eventually turn the alert level down from TA/RA to TA-Only
or Standby. On average, we expect participants to follow the
first 3-4 RAs before reducing the alert level or switching the
system off.
3) Requirements & Feasibility: Transmission by the at-
tacker would require an off-the-shelf amplifier and antenna
capable of directional transmission, with a high powered setup
costing $15,000. The attacker would also need software to
undertake the attack. A transceiver is needed to both receive
interrogations to establish the target aircraft behaviour, as well
as transmitting false aircraft messages. Management software
could then create the attack by establishing the position of the
aircraft and messages needed to cause an alarm.
With regards to software, some related tools exist to decode
Mode S signals such as gr-airmodes or dump1090 [46],
[42]. Encoders are rarer with one such example being ADSB-
Out [63], [62]. However, this is not general purpose. An
attacker would either need to build such a tool or rely on
the hobbyist community producing one open source.
Analysis of the TCAS II logic suggests that attacks creating
situations similar to transponder failure can have a range of
effects [14]. Most related to this scenario are intermittent
Mode C transmissions or duplicated Mode S addresses. For
the former, the target aircraft may generate late alerts due to
the system treating it as not providing altitude. Of the latter,
TCAS will ignore the more distance duplicate address, which
could be used to deny situational awareness by an attacker.
Physical location is important in this attack in order to
maximize range. By design, Mode C and S messages can be
transmitted and received on the ground by surveillance radars.
To achieve this, aircraft use a relatively high transmission
power of up to 250 W with groundward directional antennae,
meaning that with sufficient power this attack can occur from
the ground [3]. Because of aircraft altitude, the potential area
in which the attacker can reside is quite large and can be
maximised by locating on high ground or near an airport.
One of the main feasibility challenges of this attack is that
the aircraft may quickly move out of attack range due to its
high speed. A well-resourced attacker might deploy antenna
to multiple locations, whereas a more simplistic attacker could
instead seek higher ground to maximise range.
4) Simulator Implementation: Within the simulator, we
enact a strong attacker who covers a large geographic area,
attempting to trigger 10 alerts over the course of the flight. We
varied the angle and speed of approach by the false aircraft.
We configured these to be identical for each participant. False
aircraft began to be injected when the target aircraft flew above
2000 ft, after which the first injection began. If the participant
chose to turn the TCAS sensitivity to TA-Only, they would
still receive TAs but not RAs.
This attack was undertaken by using an invisible aircraft
model which travelled towards the target aircraft. Further work
would improve the realism of this, such as more realistic flight
patterns to avoid tipping off participants to the attack.
C. Instrument Landing System
The Instrument Landing System (ILS) allows precision
landings even in poor weather conditions. Since aircraft must
follow specific arrival routes into an airport, ILS is an im-
portant part of managing pilot workload and is the default
approach type for most airports. In extreme cases, ILS allows
aircraft to automatically land at sufficiently equipped airfields.
6150 Hz
90 Hz
Runway
Glideslope lobes
Antenna
(a) Glideslope under normal operation.
Runway
AntennaRogue Antenna
Attacker-induced lobes
Attacker Lobes
Real Lobes
(b) Glideslope under attack with rogue antenna. Note how the aircraft touch-
down zone is now at the far end of the runway. This means that if the glideslope
is followed to touchdown, there may not be enough runway to slow down.
Fig. 5: Representation of normal and under-attack glideslope
operation, based on diagrams from [21].
1) System Description: ILS consists of two components:
localizer (LOC) and glideslope (GS) [21]. A localizer provides
lateral guidance and alignment, centered on the runway cen-
terline, whereas the GS provides vertical guidance to a touch-
down zone on the runway. Typically the GS will provide a 3°
approach path, though this depends on the specific approach
and airport [48]. It is supplemented by Distance Measuring
Equipment (DME), which provides the direct distance to a
beacon without directionality.
Transmission powers of the GS and LOC are 5 W and 100 W
respectively [21]. On the carrier frequencies for the GS and
LOC overlapping 90 Hz and 150 Hz lobes provide guidance
with the overlap forming the correct approach path. The
aircraft will use the relative strength of these lobes to identify
where it is with respect to the optimal GS and centerline of
the runway. A diagram of a GS can be seen in Fig. 5a.
GSs and LOCs are monitored for accuracy to at least
10 nm beyond the runway, as well as being protected from
interference to 25 nm [49], [48]. It is important to note that
‘protection from interference’ here means avoiding systems
using nearby frequencies, rather than malicious interference.
Separately, approach lighting provides an out-of-band check
for crew on approach—Precision Approach Path Indicators
(PAPIs) are configured to match to the angle of the GS. When
an aircraft is on the correct GS, the PAPIs will show two red
and two white lights, otherwise more red or white lights are
shown as appropriate [23].
2) Attack Description: Here, the attacker is aiming to cause
unnecessary missed approaches as a result of a tampered GS.
In turn, this will use additional fuel, introduce delay and
potentially force aircraft to divert to a different airport. A
secondary aim might be to force crew to use a different, also
attacked, approach method.
The attacker replicates the real GS but with the touchdown
zone short or long of the legitimate touchdown zone by
transmitting a replica signals from aside the runway. Since
they will not be able to station themselves on the runway,
they will operate outside the airfield perimeter. This somewhat
matches the legitimate GS signal which is transmitted aside
the runway to avoid aircraft clipping the antennae.
Crucially the signals would be the same as a real GS, so
would not be identifiable by a high rate of descent, as common
GS issues can be. The difference induced by the attacker would
be subtle. For a typical 3° GS, moving it 1 km along the
runway creates a consistent height difference between the real
and false GS of approximately 52 m, or 172 ft. This could fall
within a margin of error on approach, especially whilst further
away from the runway.
Expected Response: Since this attack will see the false
GS track slightly above the real GS, it is unlikely to be
immediately obvious that it is incorrect. We expect most
participants to follow the GS until they are below cloud at
around 1000 ft, at which point they will notice a continued
slight discrepancy in AGL according to approach charts. They
may also notice such a discrepancy using the PAPI, as they
will show four white lights. At this point, we expect them to
be between 500–1000 ft AGL and opt for a missed approach
and go around.
3) Requirements & Feasibility: No significant technical
barriers exist for this attack. This is possible due to the
simplistic nature of the system—whilst it is monitored for
integrity as defined in ICAO Annex 10, this is for deviations in
the legitimate signal rather than malicious interference [32].
An ILS system will normally shut down or notify ATC if
excessive deviation is identified.
An attacker will need an SDR, amplifier and directional
antennae to replicate the antennae arrays used for the legiti-
mate GS, costing around $10,000. Since no open-source tools
exist to do this, software would need to be created but this
is achievable by moderately resourced attacker as it involves
implementing a standardised, static system. Furthermore, the
transmission power is readily achievable with consumer am-
plifiers as a typical GS is below 10 W. For reference, even
the lowest level of licensed UK amateur radio operators can
transmit in frequency bands surrounding aviation bands at up
to 10 W [41].
Related work suggests that ILS course deviation attacks
are possible using such equipment. Sathaye et al. describes
two signal generation approaches which enable ILS signal
interference, leading to an attacker being able to adjust the
localizer or glideslope as seen in the cockpit [47].
Although extensively used and relied upon, ILS signals face
challenges due to their relatively simplicity which indicates
that they are not entirely robust. The two examples as de-
scribed in [22] are:
• False lobes: lower-lobe GS signals reflecting off the
ground and appearing to be a legitimate GS according to
cockpit instruments. They are identified by their unduly
steep angle of descent, usually 9− 12◦ [22].
• Interference: namely reflections off buildings or vehi-
cles, or other aircraft moving through ILS signals and
distorting them [59]. Pilots are taught to expect this kind
of interference [40].
Challenges lie in physical location and limitations intro-
duced by monitoring. The attacker will have to locate close to
the airport perimeter to have correct signal directionality along
the runway. However, since airports are usually accessible by
road, this should be possible.
7Fig. 6: Picture of experimental setup.
Due to a lack of public information on monitoring makes it
difficult to determine whether transmitting under the legitimate
GS will trigger an alarm. Depending on attacker aim, care may
be required to avoid interference with the legitimate GS, thus
shutting the ILS down. We instead consider the ‘long’ version
of the attack, where an attacker moves the touchdown zone to
the far end of the runway, attempting go-arounds by leaving
the aircraft too high correct the approach and land with enough
runway to stop. This does introduce a limitation in that it relies
on aircraft intercepting the GS from above, which whilst not
preferred is a valid method of intercepting the GS [48]. This
would also mean the false GS is transmitted above monitoring.
4) Simulator Implementation: In the simulator, an attacker
transmits a false GS at the far end of the runway with an
effective shift of 2.05 km, or 1.27 miles, creating a difference
between the false and true GS of 107 m, or 352 ft. Due to the
way in which ILS is implemented in the simulator software,
we could not replicate also having a ‘real’ GS. To account for
this we operated on an assumption that the attacker transmits at
a higher power than the real GS in an effort to force capture on
to the false GS. The manipulation remains in place regardless
of how many approaches are made. We treat the participant
aircraft as if it is the first to encounter the attack, with ATC
not observing previous aircraft having difficulties.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
Since our attacks were specifically designed to examine
responses we wanted to allow participants to react in real
time. To do this we used a flight simulator, partially recre-
ating a cockpit environment—in this section, we describe the
experimental setup used. The work was approved by our local
ethics committee with reference number R54139/001.
A. Participants
We recruited 30 pilots who had current A320 type-rating,
or had held it in the past few years but since had moved to
larger Airbus aircraft. Our sample was recruited through pilot
forums, and open to pilots of any level of experience, First
Officer or Captain. This is appropriate since pilots are trained
and kept current with a homogeneous skill set across a given
type of aircraft. Thus, all pilots are similarly skills-equipped
to handle the scenarios we presented to them.
B. Protocol
For the purposes of control, we used the same weather
conditions, traffic, and route for four runs. Pilots were asked
to fly between two international airports, cruising at 12,000 ft,
for a total flight time of around 30 minutes. Since the setup
was single-pilot, the experimenter took the role of a limited
co-pilot, and in doing so partly an air traffic controller. In this,
the experimenter was capable of providing support in flying
the aircraft but did not give input on decisions.
Each pilot was given the first run as a familiarisation
flight, in which they could get used to the controls of the
simulator. The following three runs included some form of
attack, and was followed by a short debrief interview (provided
in supplementary material). The interview assessed the pilot
response to the attack, focussing on perception of impact, trust,
workload and safety. We recorded data from the simulator to
correlate with interview responses.
Participants knew that they were taking part in a study
looking at cyber attacks on avionic systems, but did not know
about the timing or type of attack. The details of the attacks
were explained by the experimenter in the debrief interview.
Since the interview was conducted by the experimenter, we
acknowledge that this may bias results to be more positive than
if we had conducted this anonymously. This is mostly relevant
to interview questions on the effectiveness of this approach as
training, and we note this where appropriate.
C. Equipment
Our hardware consisted of two high-end gaming PCs,
running X-Plane 11 and an aftermarket Airbus A330 model as
no reliable A320 models were available, seen in Figure 6 [37].
We checked the model fidelity with type-rated Airbus A320
pilots to ensure sufficient similarity to an A320. We provided
non-type-specific hardware controls, since the majority of fly-
ing on such an airliner involves manipulating automatic flight,
rather than directly flying with manual controls. Participant
opinions on the equipment are presented in Sec. VII-D.
VI. RESULTS
We now discuss the data collected from simulator scenarios
and participant interviews. Interview response data for all
scenarios can be seen in Tab. III and Fig. 7, with full data
in App. A. Responses are on the following scales:
• Q1. Confidence in the response being the correct one, on
a scale from 1, very confident, to 5, very unconfident.
• Q2. Workload due to the attack, on a scale from 1, no
increase, to 3, significant increase.
• Q3. Trust in systems affect due to the attack, on a scale
from 1, much more trust, to 5, much distrust.
• Q4. Impact on the flight due to the attack, on a scale
from 1, significant impact, to 4, no impact.
We also recorded yes/no responses for the following:
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Fig. 7: Stacked bar charts for participant scale responses on Q1-4. Orange represents the most ‘negative’ responses, i.e. no
effect, with blue ‘positive’, i.e. significant effect. Tabular data is provided in Appendix A.
TABLE I: Action taken during GPWS attack. If a participant
lands, they are not included in the numbers of following
approach. Percentages are of participants in that approach.
Action Count
Approach Action # % # Participants
Land 10 33.31 Go-around 20 66.7 30
Turn off 11 55.0
Land 8 40.02
Go-around 1 5.0
20
3 Turn off 1 100.0 1
• Q5. Whether they would trust systems under attack later
in flight, N/A if they did not respond to the attack.
• Q6. If participants felt the attack put the aircraft in a less
safe situation.
• Q7. If participants would respond the same way in a real
aircraft (i.e. free of simulation restrictions).
A. GPWS Attack
First, we look at the GPWS scenario. We assess participants
primarily on their actions, i.e. go-around, land, switch GPWS
off, before considering their scale responses.
Response: Participants generally responded as expected,
with a split between those opting for a terrain avoidance
manoeuvre, thus a missed approach, and those disregarding
the warning in order to land. The first approach is plotted in
Fig. 9. In Tab. I, we can see that two thirds of participants
went around on the first approach as a result of the alarm;
these participants generally remarked that their choice was an
automatic one. This is crucial as it shows that an attacker
who can trigger such an attack can cause arbitrary go-arounds
with reasonable chance of success. In one instance, the attack
triggered late; however, in debrief, the participant noted that
they would have had the same course of action regardless.
On the first approach, we found that for those opting to
go around, the mean height at which the go-around began
was 403.9 ft, with a standard deviation of 51.1 ft (see Fig. 8).
Some outliers in the form of later responses do exist, shown
in Fig. 9. Most participants responded within 100 ft of the
alarm with an interquartile range of 29.7 ft. This is expected
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Fig. 8: Minimum heights reached by participants opting to go
around in first approach of the GPWS attack.
as pilots follow the terrain warning and execute a well-drilled
manoeuvre, not allowing the aircraft to become unsafe.
To handle the attack, 11 participants switched the system off
on a second approach, finding it distracting, with another one
doing so on the first approach and going on to land. An attack
causing GPWS to be switched off has the potential for further
erosion of safety—indeed, of the 12 who switched it off, none
would trust the system later in the flight. Most participants
sought to silence the alarm on the second approach, though at
this point they were sure of their position.
Perception: As seen in Tab. III, 14 (46.7%) participants
felt that this attack put the aircraft in a less safe situation. The
numbers are lower compared to other attacks as the response
is in itself a safety manoeuvre, though some pilots felt that
due to its extreme nature, the aircraft is at additional risk.
Fig. 7 shows that this scenario has the least impact as
assessed by the participants—even so, it was judged to have
‘some impact’ on average, with 8 (26.7%) saying it was ‘sig-
nificant’. For workload, there was on average ‘some increase’
with 13 (43.3%) feeling there was a ‘significant’ increase.
On top of this, a number of remarks were made about the
startle factor involved on what appeared to be a normal
approach. Trust in the system was eroded during the scenario,
which matches with our assessment in Tab. III; 29 (96.7%)
participants felt at least ‘some distrust’.
Generally, confidence in response was very high, with an
average score of ‘very confident’. The majority of participants
(27, 90%) said they would take the same course of action in a
real aircraft. Those who did not feel this way suggested they
might have opted for a missed approach rather than landing.
Evaluation: The reaction was fairly well defined, seem-
ingly due to strict procedure on how to handle terrain alarms.
90 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 5560
Time (s)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Alt
itu
de
 (ft
)
Attack Start Time
Aerodrome Alt.
Fig. 9: Plot of time against altitude for first approach under
GPWS attack. Each line is a participant. Eight land and
disregard the alarm, on account of being sure of their position.
With two thirds of participants abandoning the approach on the
first alarm, an attacker can readily cause disruption. However,
similar tactics on following approaches were ineffective.
Clearly, a terrain avoidance manoeuvre is the correct course
of action for safety when in doubt, but if caused by an attack
(and absence of dangerous terrain) rather than genuine danger,
it unduly adds workload and seeds distrust in the systems. This
is reinforced by all but one participant feeling some distrust,
and almost half seeing a significant workload increase.
In turn, this means that whilst some safety erosion might
occur as a secondary effect, the primary impact is a repeatable
disruption. A major challenge with the attack is that it cannot
be easily defended against due to its short burst nature and
exploitation of basic radar. Even if identified as a problem
and incoming aircraft are informed about it, they would have
to ignore a key safety system due to a security issue.
B. TCAS Attack
Next, we consider the TCAS attack. Results indicate that
this is the most concerning attack to the participants.
Response: An action summary is given in Tab. II. We
provide the ‘end-state’ for the selected TCAS mode (e.g., if
a participant selects TA Only then Standby, they are under
Standby) against actions taken outside of normal flight. Ac-
tions are categorised into continue on route, i.e. no extra action
taken, avoidance manoeuvre, in which the participant changes
course, or divert to origin, i.e. return to the departure airport.
Some 26 participants (87%) turned TCAS to TA Only, with
11 (37%) switching it to Standby. Participants switched to TA
Only with a mean 4.5 RAs (standard deviation 1.7), then down
to standby after another mean 2.8 TAs (standard deviation 2.1).
Two participants went straight from TA/RA to Standby, one
after three RAs, another after six.
Reasons cited for these changes were additional workload
of responding to TAs and RAs, but also the distraction factor
of repeatedly having to respond to the alerts. Looking at
the control response in more detail, three of those eventually
turning the transponder to TA Only and three of those turning
TABLE II: Responses to the TCAS attack scenario, mapping
the final selected TCAS mode against actions or manoeuvres
taken by the pilot. Percentages are of all participants.
Final Selected TCAS Mode
TA/RA TA-Only Standby Total
Action # % # % # % # %
Continue
on route 4 13.3 10 33.3 8 26.7 22 73.3
Avoidance
manoeuvre 0 0.0 3 10.0 3 10.0 6 20.0
Divert
to origin 0 0.0 2 6.7 0 0.0 2 6.7
Total 4 13.3 15 50.0 11 36.7 30 100.0
it to standby took avoiding action. The action itself varied per
participant but for some involved climbing above the planned
cruise altitude or making horizontal manoeuvres to try to avoid
the attacker’s traffic. Two other participants diverted back to
the origin airport rather than continue with malfunctioning
TCAS. Three of the remaining participants did feel that TCAS
was providing spurious returns but felt the risk of downgrading
the system was too high and instead opted to follow the RAs
as issued, rather than turn the transponder to TA Only. The
final participant was not aware of the ability to go to TA Only
and so remained in TA/RA.
Perception: Assessing the impact, 27 (90%) pilots felt
that the attack had at least ‘some impact’, with 19 (63%)
feeling that it had ‘significant impact’. This was coupled with
29 (97%) feeling that there was at least ‘some increase’ in
workload. Typically, this increase in workload was due to
having to respond to regular RAs and dealing with periodic
distraction. An unduly increased workload creates further
problems for the crew managing the situation, and can lead to
errors.
Looking to perceived safety, 28 (97%) of pilots felt that the
attack put the aircraft in an unsafe—or potentially unsafe—
situation. One cause for concern was for those on board, who
might be moving about the cabin, thus injured in an extreme
manoeuvre such as an RA. Some noted the possible effects
on surrounding traffic in the event of following a spurious
RA. Similarly, 29 (97%) of participants felt that they had at
least ‘some distrust’ in TCAS during the scenario. Again, this
is problematic as it indicates that an attacker with moderate
ability can sow distrust in critical aircraft safety systems.
Evaluation: In this scenario, the most common option
was to reduce the alerting level of TCAS to either only notify
of traffic (TA Only) or to switch the system off. We were
particularly interested in how many RAs would cause a pilot
to reduce this sensitivity, since this is the point at which an
attacker can reduce the effect of a safety system. On average,
our participants took 4-5 RAs to reduce the sensitivity, or
approximately 7 to switch it off. Given that TCAS is a final
line of defence against mid-air collision, this is problematic.
This attack presents the best example of a safety against
security trade-off. If TCAS is left at full sensitivity, having
the attacker able to trigger extreme changes of course through
RAs puts other aircraft at risk of also having TCAS alarms.
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TABLE III: Summary of participant actions and responses to
debrief yes/no questions. For some participants, the question
was not applicable due to previous actions, hence N/A. Per-
centages are of all participants, for each question.
Response
Yes No N/A
Attack Question # % # % # %
Q5–Trust 1 3.3 25 83.4 4 13.3
Q6–Safety 19 63.3 11 36.7 - -GS
Q7–Same 28 93.3 2 6.7 - -
Q5–Trust 4 13.3 22 73.4 4 13.3
Q6–Safety 28 93.3 2 6.7 - -TCAS
Q7–Same 30 100.0 0 0.0 - -
Q5–Trust 0 0.0 12 40.0 18 60.0
Q6–Safety 14 46.7 16 53.3 - -GPWS
Q7–Same 27 90.0 3 10.0 - -
Furthermore, resolving these RAs adds workload for the crew
and potentially removes their attention from other tasks.
Accounting for this, switching the system to TA Only is a
fair balance as it does not lose all the situational awareness
that TCAS provides. However, disruption is caused before this
point—repeated RAs would affect nearby traffic, passenger
comfort and safety as well as crew workload.
C. Glideslope Spoof
We now look at the glideslope spoof, where an attacker aims
to capture a pilot on a false GS. We focus on the first approach,
in which the participants knew least about the attack.
Response: On encountering the attack, 4 (13.3%) par-
ticipants chose to land anyway on account of having a good
visual picture. Of the 26 (86.7%) participants choosing to go
around, three went around a further time. The choices after
participants identified a problem with the GS are as follows:
• 1 (3.3%) used a VHF Omnidirectional Range approach,
• 2 (6.7%) used a Surveillance Radar Approach (SRA),
which relies on higher involvement with ATC,
• 8 (26.7%) flew a localizer only approach (LOC DME) on
account of identifying GS problems,
• 9 (30.0%) dropped ILS completely, and used an Area
Navigation (RNAV) approach, which is based on GPS,
• 6 (20.0%) flew a visual approach due to good conditions.
The split highlights that the attack invokes a response grey
area. Eleven participants chose to forgo ILS completely and
use SRA or RNAV approaches as they could not identify the
issue. However, eight were happy to use LOC DME since they
had identified that just the GS was affected.
Fig. 10a and 10b show box plots for the height above
ground level (in feet) and distance (in miles) from the run-
way touchdown zone, respectively. This is plotted for each
participant opting to go-around on the first approach at the
point of choosing to abort the approach. The mean go-around
altitude was 930.0 ft, with a standard deviation of 235.8 ft,
and distance of 1.1 miles, with a standard deviation of 0.7
miles. Since preparation for a go-around takes a few seconds,
the mean point is just as participants descended below 1000 ft.
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Fig. 10: Box plots of participants performing a go-around on
the first approach under the glideslope attack.
Considering that a 3° GS has a rate of descent of 700 ft/min,
this means the go-around begins with just over a minute to
touchdown. In poor weather, this might be the first time the
pilots see the runway, making for a short amount of time to
abort the approach. That the attack is subtle enough for the
aircraft to get so close to landing demonstrates how difficult
it is to clearly identify that an ILS attack is under way.
Perception: Some 13 (43.3%) participants found the
attack had ‘some’ impact or greater, as shown in Fig. 7. The
GS attack had a small perceived workload increase with 22
(73.3%) participants claiming ‘some’ increase, which may be
due to the GS attack occurring gradually, higher above the
ground with PAPIs providing visual checks. A number of
participants noted that this attack would be harder to deal with
in worse weather conditions. Even so, 26 (86.7%) participants
performed a go-around as a result of being unsure.
As with TCAS and GPWS, the attack caused ‘some’ distrust
in aircraft systems, with 23 (76.7%) participants remarking
‘some’ or ‘significant’ impact. However, some participants
correctly identified that the ground systems were at fault and
so did not distrust the aircraft. Furthermore, Tab. III shows that
of the 26 (86.7%) participants, who did perform a go-around,
all but one would not trust the GS on a second approach. This
is reinforced by the fact that 19 (63.3%) felt that the attack
put the aircraft in a less safe situation.
Evaluation: As well as almost two thirds of participants
feeling that the attack put the aircraft in a less safe situation,
over 85% of participants abort their first approach and go
around. Although subtle, this attack has potential for disrup-
tion. Even though some participants did not identify the prob-
lem, the indication of one was enough for the majority to avoid
the GS and choose another approach method. Switching to a
different approach not only increases workload—as indicated
in our perception responses—but may affect nearby traffic. For
example, an SRA approach requires heavy ATC interaction,
tying up a controller temporarily. Furthermore, not all airports
are equipped to handle all approach types.
Such a division is interesting; whilst the most safe and
secure option is to use an approach outside of the ILS such
as SRA or RNAV, no single approach emerged as a favourite.
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This could be due to the GS not malfunctioning in expected
ways such as bending or being too steep. On top of this,
participants either responded quite late, i.e. whilst over the
runway, or quite early in choosing to go around (Fig. 10b. The
group of late responders indicates the subtlety of the attack as
they waited to see what happened; in this case, an early abort
and switch to a different approach is the safer choice.
Attempting to perform this attack on numerous consecutive
aircraft would likely see ATC instructing to not use the ILS,
making the attack a form of denial of service. Such an
eventuality has a range of possible consequences including
diversions or reduced airport capacity due to higher separation.
VII. DISCUSSION
We now explore the effects across all considered attacks,
how they affect the way the aircraft is flown and on the
participants.
A. Effect on Safety
On balance, our expected response for each attack was for
participants to take the ‘safest’ option in the circumstances
which typically led to disruption. Because of this, we did not
necessarily expect much perceived loss of safety. This was not
the case; for TCAS and GS, 93.3% and 63.3% felt the attack
made the aircraft less safe. For TCAS, this is likely due to
the uncertainty of the situation, with pilots not expecting false
alarms. In the case of GS, the safety concern comes from how
late the discrepancy is apparent and the situation this leaves
the aircraft in. The exception to this was the GPWS attack,
in which the terrain avoidance manoeuvre is the de facto safe
option so fewer pilots felt safety was affected. Arguably, this
highlights the interplay of safety and security the most. Even
though most pilots took the safe option, they still felt they
were compromised by factors out of their control.
Furthermore, the range of decisions taken indicates that
these attacks do indeed create gray areas for responses. In an
industry where safety is paramount and relies on well-defined
procedure, the ability for an attacker to create situations
open for interpretation is concerning. It is especially so when
considering that these are systems tied closely to aircraft
safety.
B. Cost of Disruption
We have demonstrated the ability for these attacks to cause
missed approaches and diversions. With this in mind, we can
estimate the cost of this attack on an aircraft. As an example,
we use Boeing aircraft due to public fuel usage information
to calculate the cost of a missed approach. For their smaller
737-800 aircraft, the missed approach uses 127 kg (41.79 gal)
more fuel than a successful one; for the larger 777-200, it is
399 kg (111.55 gal) more [44]. Coupled with a nominal jet fuel
cost of 184.58 c/gal, this costs approximately $77 for the 737
or $205 for the 777.2 Added to the expense of further time
in the air—more difficult to predict as it depends on factors
such as the airfield and traffic—plus a second approach, which
2Calculated using IATA Jet Fuel Price Monitor for 18th January 2019 [31].
costs approximately $139 (using 230 kg, or 75.68 gal) or for
the 737, or $516 for the 777 (using 850 kg, or 279.69 gal), this
becomes expensive for the airline.
Diversions add further expense, with potential effects on
scheduling or passenger inconvenience. The UK Civil Aviation
Authority estimates that these can cost an airline between
£10,000–£80,000, depending on the size of the aircraft and
location of diversion [8]. For example, passenger disruption
causing diversion aboard a Norweigan flight cost e100,000
in 2018 [12], [16]. Closed airports are similarly costly, with
drones closing London Gatwick for two days in December
2018 and costing airline Easyjet £15 million [36].
C. Additional Impact Factors
In debrief, participants raised a number of other factors
which would affect the impact of attacks. Weather conditions
were prominent; all scenarios would be more difficult to handle
in poor visibility. Particularly for the approach-based GS and
GPWS attacks, good visibility allowed participants to arrive at
their decisions more quickly. Some participants noted it would
be hard to identify the GS attack under automatic landing
conditions, leaving much less time for pilots to respond.
Other contributing factors include tiredness and terrain. In
response to the GPWS attack, one participant who chose not to
go around commented that their action in a real aircraft would
depend on tiredness, as well as weather and how busy the crew
were. Again in the GPWS attack, others identified that terrain
surrounding the airport affects their choice—they would be
much more likely to abort an approach in challenging terrain,
and less if they are familiar with the airport.
D. Simulation for Training
To assess whether responses were realistic, we asked each
participant whether their response to each scenario would be
the same in a real aircraft. We found that for:
• GPWS, 27 (90.0%) would do the same, and the remain-
ing three would go around in the same scenario again,
• TCAS, 30 (100.0%) would do the same,
• Glideslope, 28 (93.3%) would do the same with the
remaining two opting to go around and revert to RNAV.
We asked each participant for their views the value of such
experiments or training in preparation for cyber attack. All
participants felt the scenarios were useful, and 28 (93.3%)
commented that training for cyber attacks using a simulator
would be valuable. We also asked if they felt limited by the
simulation set up, on a scale of ‘1–not’, ‘2–somewhat’ and
‘3–heavily’ limited, with the average response corresponding
to ‘somewhat’. The main limits were lack of a second crew
member, and the general (rather than Airbus specific) controls.
We do note that these figures are subject to some bias but we
feel that the results are sufficiently strong that the effect on
our conclusion is minimal.
The results suggest that this method can be valuable both in
identifying crew response to attacks and providing cyber attack
readiness. Furthermore, the fact that the scenarios in this paper
lie in procedural gray areas and do not have a series of steps to
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resolve them provides an ideal opportunity for training. One
point of caution is negative training, with some participants
noting that care must be taken to avoid training pilots to ignore
or distrust their systems.
VIII. MITIGATIONS
Most of the security problems enabling these attacks are due
to a lack of deployed security mechanisms. This section offers
potential mitigations, outside of expensive redeployment.
Spectrum Monitoring: Both GPWS and GS attacks re-
quire the attacker to transmit at a reasonable power level near
to the airport. Early warning of such attacks could be provided
using spectrum monitoring around the airfield on key aviation
frequencies, compared against fingerprints of legitimate sig-
nals and regions in which they should be transmitted. This
could be achieved with low-cost sensor networks, however a
reasonable investment into infrastructure to process and store
the collected data would be needed.
Crowdsourced Air Traffic Surveillance: A larger scale
version of this would use crowdsourced networks collecting
air traffic surveillance signals to detect message injection. This
would be useful against the TCAS since it can occur over a
much larger area. These networks, such as Flightradar24 [24]
or Opensky Network [51], consist of geographically distributed
low-cost sensors operated by members of the public, who feed
data to a central server. A benefit of this kind of network is the
ability to cross-check legitimate message reception, helping to
identify and locate rogue messages. A theoretical foundation
for using this can be seen in [58].
Training for Pilot Awareness: As demonstrated, the
participants handled the scenarios safely; existing training
provides the skills to do so. However, pilots also felt that the
situations led to losses in safety, and that the scenarios had
value from exposing them to unusual situations. Naturally,
processes which help reduce startling and give experience
in handling new situations can be beneficial (see Sec. II).
To develop this into a training exercise, more complete and
realistic scenarios incorporating a full crew and realistic ATC
could be developed.
Security by Design: Longer term, avionic communica-
tions systems need secure design. Current trends suggest that
next generation data links, likely to come into use in around
10 years, have some security by default. AeroMACS is the
most developed example so far and derivative of IEEE 802.16e
(WiMAX), from which it inherits secure communications [61],
[29], [30]. However, the systems in this paper will not be
replaced soon and security needs to be patched in. Both TCAS
and GS/ILS have the opportunity to make such changes. For
ILS signals, research looking into using Distance Measuring
Equipment (DME) for data carrying could provide a second
channel for ILS integrity and authentication [64]. Such work
for TCAS does not yet exist.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we describe three novel practical wireless
interference attacks on avionics systems. We implement them
in a standard flight simulator and test their impact with 30
pilots in the loop. The attacks are not sufficiently mitigated
by aviation’s prevalent safety culture and can cause disruption,
financial loss, and reputational damage. Crucially, participants
saw a reduction in safety under the wrong circumstances, e.g.
as safety systems were switched off in 38% of cases.
Our results imply that the attack on TCAS is the most
concerning as it combines widespread inconvenience and
potential safety reduction. Both GS/ILS and GPWS also pose
problems, though are easier to mitigate on the flight deck.
Finally, we conclude that flight simulation for wireless attack
awareness or training has potential to aid and prepare crew.
Since preventative security by design will not be deployable
in the near-term, such training could be highly valuable.
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APPENDIX
In Figure 7, we provide a chart representation of interview
responses by participants, relating to their experiences of each
attack. We provide the full data for this table on following
page.
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TABLE IV: Summary of participant interview responses for attack scenarios. Scale points are normalized so that 1 represents
the most ‘positive’ point, i.e. the greatest change, and the highest value represents the most ‘negative’ i.e. no change. For
example, using Q4 relating to impact, 1 is the ‘significant impact’ response. Dash indicates where no scale value existed, and
representative scale point is taken as scale response at the rounded mean, e.g. for impact, 1.4 will be ‘significant impact’.
Number of Participant Responses per Scale Point
Attack Question 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Mean RepresentativeScale Point Std. Dev
Impact 10 3 10 2 4 0 1 - - 1.85 Some impact 0.787
Confidence 21 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.28 Very confident 0.441
Workload 6 1 22 1 0 - - - - 1.80 Some increase 0.420GS
Trust 5 0 18 0 7 0 0 0 0 2.07 Some distrust 0.629
Impact 19 3 5 2 1 0 0 - - 1.38 Significant impact 0.573
Confidence 12 4 11 0 3 0 0 0 0 1.63 Somewhat confident 0.639
Workload 16 4 9 1 0 - - - - 1.42 Significant increase 0.484TCAS
Trust 19 2 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.36 Much distrust 0.531
Impact 8 2 13 0 3 2 2 - - 2.03 Some impact 0.894
Confidence 24 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.23 Very confident 0.496
Workload 13 2 11 3 1 - - - - 1.62 Some increase 0.601GPWS
Trust 10 3 16 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.65 Some distrust 0.519
